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Clearly, the world is in an extraordinary state of flux and uncertainty, and the year 
2003 only exacerbated the uncertainties. This was the message I heard as I traveled 
for the Secretary-General to five continents in the last two weeks. In a world of such 
divisions of rich and poor, of pandemic disease, of environmental stress, of 
continuing demographic pressures, and of huge interconnectedness, everybody in the 
world is asking, “How do we fit in? What does the war on terrorism really mean for 
us? Is the world economy unstable? Will it grow? Will it collapse? Can globalization 
succeed?”  
 
These are questions that nobody can answer; we can only try our best to put 
our shoulder to the positive forces, and against the negative ones.  If I weigh the 
questions, I do come out on the side that we can certainly make this work, but to do 
so we have to understand these processes much more deeply than we have to date.  I 
want to try to explain what I think helps a region or a society succeed in the process 
of globalization, and, knowing that, what we can do to ensure that the benefits of 
globalization truly spread to the entire world. 
 
About ten days ago I was in East Asia. What a difference in economic 
outcomes from what we have seen in Latin America in the past two decades! East 
Asia, as everybody knows, has successfully adjusted to globalization, creating 
dramatic and positive economic and social change in a vast region. With 1.3 billion 
people, China has had a doubling of living standards now for each decade for the past 
quarter century, at a time when Latin America has been almost stagnant. It therefore 
behooves us to ask what’s happening, why is such dynamic progress being made, and 
how can those lessons be more generally applied to Brazil, to Latin America, and of 
course to the regions of the world even more desperately being left behind, such as 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where President Lula is visiting today. 
 
 The Chinese progress is complex and highly debated, but I think that what 
stands fundamentally at the core of China’s progress is the decision a quarter century 
ago to embrace the globalization process, and to understand that China’s economic 
progress could only be assured if China took on the challenge of becoming 
competitive in the world economy. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiao Ping came 
to power, and flung open the doors of China, after a long period in which China had 
been one of the most closed societies in the world. Of course, the most remarkable 
aspect of that change was that within a period of twenty years, China became one of 
the powerhouses of the world economy. In the coastal regions of China, with a 
population of about 300 million people, foreign investors have brought in capital at a 
rate of about 50 billion dollars a year in recent years to establish enterprises for global 
production.  
 
What China’s economic reforms really meant was that China went out to 
achieve competitiveness in world markets by bringing in world-class technology, 
world-class capital and a business environment in which production could be carried 
out efficiently and at low cost by international standards. By bringing in vast amounts 
of technology and capital during roughly the last twenty years, China went from 
being a nearly closed economy, where exports were on the order of about 20 billion 
dollars in mostly primary commodities, to having exports of almost 350 billion 
dollars this year, an increase of more than fifteen times in the last two decades.  
 
Of course, this is changing geopolitics as well as economics. China has by 
now accumulated more than four hundred billion dollars of foreign exchange 
reserves, it is perhaps the largest holder of US treasury bills of any single investor in 
the world, and it is now increasingly the political powerhouse of Asia, as well as the 
economic powerhouse of Asia.  When President Bush went to Asia a couple of weeks 
ago to complain about China’s economic policies, what was notable was that virtually 
all of Asia’s leaders sided with China against the pressures of the United States, 
because China plays such an important economic role now throughout the entire East 
Asian region that nobody wanted to let the United States jeopardize that engine of 
dynamism. Geopolitics follows economics.  
 
Globalization has proved to be a success for China in political terms as well as 
in economic development. What I think is notable and crucial in this lesson was the 
conscious decision of China’s leadership that economic success cannot be achieved 
by looking inward, the strategy that Mao had followed, and that China had to use its 
full range of economic policies to promote the export competitiveness of China’s 
industrial production. 
 
This is where I think Asia and Latin America fundamentally differed in the 
past twenty years. China in the 1980s and 1990s, and India in the 1990s, said, “We 
have to export to survive,” and, “By exporting and competing aggressively in the 
world market we’ll raise technology, by raising technology we’ll raise living 
standards and we’ll raise our geopolitical status.” On the other hand, Latin America 
remained until the past decade very much inward-looking, often nursing its wounds 
rather than looking out to world markets. 
 
 I remember distinctly, and with some distress, a conversation I had with a 
Brazilian government leader in the mid-1990s, a few years after the initial success of 
the stabilization program here in 1994. I said, “You’re not competing internationally, 
Brazil is not exporting dynamically to the world, it is not attracting foreign 
investment the same way that China is.” He replied with something which was very 
categorical, and very much part of the mindset of this region until very recently. He 
said, “Jeff, don’t worry so much. We have a huge internal market. Our business can 
make money addressing the internal market.” He lost his job the next year, in the 
balance of payments crisis of 1999.  
 
The point really stuck with me; there was a notion in Brazil, Argentina, and in 
much of the region until recently, that one can live with natural resource exports and 
basically focus on the internal market, and this stood in stark contrast to what I was 
seeing in Asia on each visit over the past twenty years. I think things are changing 
dramatically now in Brazil, and potentially in other parts of Latin America, though 
not yet enough.  
 
After the crisis of 1999, Brazil had a sudden spurt of exports. Brazilian 
business saw that exports were really not only a way to survive, but to thrive. For the 
first time in quite a long time, Brazilian political leadership got the notion that 
Brazil’s ability to compete internationally may be the defining element of the strategy 
of economic development. As I review the newspapers and look at the recent political 
decisions here, I’m happy to see that a good notion seems to be taking hold: 
globalization is increasingly seen as a strategy for development, and Brazil’s 
competing in the world is fundamental to success. It is the lesson of success in other 
parts of the world, and it is still the unmet challenge for Latin America. 
 
As I said at the beginning, many of the trends in this region are conducive to 
success in meeting the challenge of globalization. Brazil, I think, has everything that 
it takes to do it, if there is a strategic focus on being a competitive world leader. 
However, it requires a change of emphasis and a change of strategy from what has 
been typical for several decades. Most importantly, with a Brazilian population that is 
increasingly centered in the working age, with slowing population growth, and with 
an increasingly educated population, Brazil has the chance to follow the same trends 
as China, and to achieve the same kind of growth rates that have eluded this country 
for the past quarter-century.  
 
In my opinion, there are two fundamental structural targets that would need to 
be achieved for this success, and they’re closely related. 
 
The first is a major renewed and bold focus on educational achievement in 
Brazil, that is, a greatly expanded investment in education at every level. It must 
particularly ensure that every Brazilian child has at least completed secondary 
education, and that a substantial proportion of Brazil’s children are achieving 
university-level education in the coming years. Without this, Brazil will not be able to 
capitalize on its great opportunity today. It will maintain its competitiveness in 
traditional sectors: agriculture, primary commodities, and basic industry. However, 
that will not be enough to achieve the kind of dynamism that we know to be possible 
in the global economy. For that, Brazil will need education that far exceeds current 
standards, where the average of years of schooling completed in the Brazilian adult 
education is only on the order of five years today, and where it should be at least ten 
to fifteen years, looking a generation ahead.  
 
The second (closely-related) aspect of strategy which China’s success 
illustrates, and which is yet to be implemented in most of Latin America, is the 
recognition that successful global competitiveness requires a strategy and an untiring 
effort at technological upgrading.  This comes through investments in research and 
development and through investments in capital goods that raise productivity via 
technological advance.  
 
Every time I have visited Asia in the last decade, the discussions have been 
the same – almost everything was about technology: biotechnology, agricultural 
technology, electronics, advances in information and communication technology, 
how to reorder the scientific community in China, and how to increase public 
investment in science. This discussion, which I think is at the core of the economic 
advance, is not the kind of discussion that one typically has in Latin America, at least 
not until very recently. Korea and Taiwan are investing almost 3% of their Gross 
Domestic Product in research and development these days. China is now investing 
1% of its Gross Domestic Product in science, and that percentage is rising rapidly. In 
Brazil, the investments in research and development are still only a little bit above 
0.5% of Gross Domestic Product. In Argentina, they are even lower: less than a 0.5% 
of Gross Domestic Product. In Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, 
your Andean neighbors, the investments in research and development are even lower. 
Successful globalization requires an educated population making advances in science 
and technology. Therefore, investments in education need to be complemented by 
investments in research and development. That way, the traditional sectors of the past 
are no longer looked upon as the basis for economic advance in the future. 
 
Almost every month in the United States, I’m flying on an Embraer, a 
wonderful Brazilian aircraft displaying state of the art technology. That’s the kind of 
industry that can propel Brazil to the highest levels of income in the future. However, 
that industry, and so many others that Brazil could excel in (consumer appliances, 
electrical machinery, information technology, agricultural biotechnology, etc.), 
require the kind of concerted national effort that has not been high on the agenda.  
 
I was asked yesterday about biotechnology. Should Brazil adopt 
agrobiotechnology? Not only should Brazil adopt agrobiotechnology, Brazil should 
see itself as in the scientific lead in that technology. Here is an area which, on the one 
hand, plays to the core of Brazil’s strengths – agriculture – and on the other hand 
brings the most cutting-edge biological knowledge; how could Brazil turn away from 
such promising technology? China is investing heavily in this area; they will be your 
competitors in the future. You should be prepared to meet the competition. 
